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The civil-military-relations literature has long concentrated on domestic factors in
explaining the relationship between civilians and the military. This article concentrates
on the effect of an external actor, the European Union (EU), on civil-military relations in
Greece and Turkey. The main findings reveal that the two countries shared similar char-
acteristics until the mid-1970s. However, their path of civil-military relations diverged
considerably as soon as Greece’s EU membership prospect became tangible. While in the
Greek case, “civilianization” took place, Turkey had witnessed a mere “demilitarization”
of its regime. However, the article also shows how EU membership paves the way for the
improvement of civil-military relations in the Turkish case.
Keywords: civil-military relations; democratization; EU conditionalities; Greece;
Turkey
The literature on civil-military relations has documented that due to significant dif-ferences among regions and countries, developing an overarching theory on the
subject is unlikely. Thus, rather than base their arguments on a slippery ground of
cross-country and/or comparative analyses, scholars in the field preferred to con-
centrate on single case studies and to explain developments, solely on the basis of
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endogenous factors. Recently, however, there have been attempts to show the inade-
quate nature of the classical theories on civil-military relations, such as the ones pro-
posed by Huntington and Janowitz,1 in explaining the recent course of civil-military
relations shaped by the changing security environment, especially after the cold war.2
Furthermore, some scholars have argued that the scope of civil-military relations
exceeds the boundaries of the sovereign state and the “external factor” is an important
variable in explaining civil-military relations in any single country.3 Although the
European Union4 and NATO appear as the two contemporary examples of this fact,
there is much research to be undertaken in this relatively new domain.5
Analyzing the role of one of these external actors, the European Union, in (re)shap-
ing civil-military relations toward a liberal-democratic framework constitutes the
main focus of this article, the objective of which is twofold: (1) to compare and con-
trast civil-military relations in Greece and Turkey and (2) to document the effect of EU
conditionalities on the improvement of civil-military relations. We will try to explore
the EU-induced developments in the sphere of civil-military relations by using a lon-
gitudinal analysis for the Greek and Turkish cases. Our main argument is twofold.
First, we argue that the development of civil-military relations in the two case studies
diverged considerably after 1974; in Greece, “civilianization” has occurred, that is, the
devolution of responsibility from the military to the civilian leadership at all levels of
government. In the Turkish case, the best description for the observable change is
“demilitarization,” that is, a mere diminishing of the military’s role in public decision
making.6 Second, although this divergence has been triggered mostly by domestic
institutional changes, EU membership requirements have been a catalyst to strengthen
the domestic equilibrium of forces conducive to a liberal-democratic framework. The
case of Turkey, as we will demonstrate, constitutes a further example for the
functioning of the EU conditionalities as a “commitment device.”
Before proceeding with the main argument, we will first outline our theoretical
framework to highlight the importance of the external factors and then present the con-
text of civil-military relations in Greece and Turkey by briefly outlining the history of
military intervention into politics in the two countries. In the final part, we will discuss
how EU conditionalities helped the civilianization of civil-military relations in the
Greek case and whether Turkey’s EU accession process can lead to a similar outcome.
The Role of External Factors in Explaining
Civil-Military Relations
This study aims to benefit from case-study methodology since “case studies are the
preferred strategy when ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are being posed, when the investi-
gator has little control over events. And when the focus is on a contemporary phenom-
enon within some real-life context.”7 Our case studies are proposed to be explanatory,
aimed at making some “analytical generalizations” to expand and generalize particu-
lar sets of results to some broader theory.8 Second, we prefer multiple-case design to
the single-case one since (1) analytic (or cross-case) conclusions independently aris-
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ing from two cases will be more powerful than those coming from a single case alone,
and (2) the context or domestic conditions of the two cases differ to some extent, and
as Yin argued, “if under different circumstances you still can arrive at common con-
clusions from both cases, they will have immeasurably expanded the generalizability
of your findings compared to those from a single case alone.”9
In case-study methodology, constructing a preliminary theory related to the topic
of study is crucial to determine the questions to be posed as well as the answers to be
given to these “why” and “how” questions. Before a researcher puts forward his or her
initial theoretical propositions, or “a [hypothetical scenario] about why acts, events,
structure and thoughts,”10 he or she should examine some of the work done as the exist-
ing literature may provide a rich theoretical framework for designing a case study.11
The empirical findings in our case studies do not confirm the famous Hunting-
tonian thesis on the professionalized military and the alleged positive repercussions
that such a process has on reducing the military’s interference in civilian affairs.12
NATO membership for both Greece and Turkey in the 1950s and subsequent
professionalization, rather than limiting the military’s political influence, have con-
solidated the military’s political role and paved the way for the direct takeover of
power by the military through coups d’etat: in 1967 in Greece and 1960 in Turkey.
Therefore, for the countries analyzed in this study, the external source of improve-
ment is the “EU factor” as it has the potential of acting as a commitment device for
civilians to undertake necessary democratic reforms as well as limiting the span of the
military’s influence with its “hands-tying” effects on political involvement. Although
the degree of influence that the external factor actually plays in assisting the democra-
tization and consolidation processes varies, it will be shown to be, at the very mini-
mum, a revitalizing factor toward establishing a new, democratic set of rules to which
both the armed forces and the civilian authorities will feel compelled to comply.
The European Union imposes numerous conditions on the applicant countries that
want to join the Union, to avoid any risk of newcomers being politically unstable. By
consigning themselves to these conditions, the governments of the applicant countries
locate themselves on the “EU accession track” and undertake many reforms to achieve
full membership. Although these conditions have always existed in one way or
another, they were explicitly spelled out at the Copenhagen European Council (1993)
as including a stable democracy, competitive market economy, and a capacity to
implement EU laws and policies.13
When dealing with the applicant countries, the European Union has used “carrots”
rather than “sticks” by granting or withholding rewards but not by punishing
noncompliant states.14 By using conditionalities, the European Union becomes a
“focal point” by providing a framework to work toward, by helping to overcome insti-
tutional or bureaucratic inertia, and by avoiding a lengthy search for a domestic politi-
cal consensus in some areas.15 Furthermore, the European Union provides incentives
for rapid change that entrench reforms and can help protect governments in power
from opposition pressure and backsliding.16
The European Union has a variety of techniques at its disposal to fulfill its function
as a commitment device.17 The most effective conditionality tool is access to progres-
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sive stages in the accession process or, to put it simply, being promoted from one
“waiting room” to another. Benchmarking and monitoring are further effective condi-
tionality devices. The key mechanism for this lever of conditionality is the commis-
sion’s “Regular Reports” assessing the candidates’ progress in meeting condition-
alities mainly imposed by the “Accession Partnerships.”18
The theoretical discussion outlined above shows that there is an explicit, causal
mechanism linking the EU accession process with a potential improvement in civil-
military relations. The European Union has the means to affect civil-military relations
in the countries aspiring to join it in two ways: directly and indirectly. First, the Euro-
pean Union may define its own parameters for civil-military relations directly since it
“anticipate[s] military cooperation and coordinated civilian control of military activi-
ties across national borders.”19 The European Union can prescribe to the applicant
countries harmonized domestic arrangements affecting civil-military relations among
all member states “to protect and sustain democratic values in a transnational context”
and “to create and enforce international standards of civil-military relations.”20
Second, EU conditionalities imposed on the applicant countries function as a com-
mitment device by enhancing the government’s power base to impose reforms and
resist the demands of rent-seeking groups that may wish to oppose any reform pro-
posal that aims to change the status quo. It also creates a stable environment conducive
to consensus-seeking compromises among the main political actors to facilitate EU
accession, as well as to setting rules that limit the discretion of policy makers and/or
align their incentives with long-term policy objectives. That is, the European Union is
indirectly contributing to the consolidation of applicant countries’ democracy; in
other words, it creates an environment for democratic reforms to be undertaken, func-
tioning as a commitment device, the result of which being that the prerogatives of a
politically active military can be curbed to bring it in line with a liberal-democratic
framework of civil-military relations.
Therefore, EU conditionalities are most likely to contribute, directly or indirectly,
to the improvement of civil-military relations. The hypothesis will be supported below
with evidence from the Greek case of democratic consolidation, as well as the liberal-
democratic reforms under way in Turkey.
The Greek Military in Politics
Ever since the creation of the modern Greek state, the officer corps were defined by
characteristics broadly similar to those found in the rest of society: corruption, nepo-
tism, and clientelistic practices hindered the development of liberal democracy and
“spilled over” to the armed forces leading to low levels of organizational readiness.21
In 1909 and after, a governmental proposal for the army’s reorganization had met with
disapproval; representatives of the army and navy created the Military League and
called for a series of economic and political reforms.22 It was the first direct involve-
ment of the military in civilian affairs.
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Beginning in 1915, and with the disagreement of Prime Minister Venizelos with the
king, a split occurred in the Greek middle class over the future direction of the coun-
try.23 While the prime minister expressed the interests and aspirations of an emerging
entrepreneurial class, the throne represented the more traditional, conservative forces.
The restoration of the monarchy (abolished in 1923) strengthened the grip of the con-
servatives and was further assisted by the armed forces. The latter, having been totally
purged of their liberal members following an unsuccessful coup attempt by Venizelos
sympathizers in 1935, were able to gain absolute control under the auspices of the
Metaxas dictatorship in August 1936.24 After World War II, and although parliamen-
tary democracy was restored following the civil war (1946-1949), Greece was effec-
tively ruled by the palace; by a tightly controlled, antileftist parliament; and by the mil-
itary establishment.25 It was, according to Mouzelis, a “quasi-parliamentary regime”
where the military constituted a central pillar of the state apparatus.26 Beginning in
1953, liberalization policies aimed at opening up the Greek economy to foreign capi-
tal were implemented. Investment by foreign capital in the Greek market increased at
an impressive rate,27 while industrialization accelerated rapidly. “Between 1960 and
1967, the Greek GNP grew at an annual average of 6.7%.”28 This development brought
about a substantial increase in living standards for the rural and lower middle classes
who were excluded from political life during the postwar era. George Papandreou’s
Center Union Party had succeeded in internalizing the calls for further liberalization
of the system and posed a challenge to the rules of the game set by the regime.29 When
Papandreou’s government of 1963 to 1965 was overthrown, the colonels intervened
and tore down the malfunctioning democracy.30
Greece’s entry into NATO in 1952 had important long-term consequences for the
military, especially with regard to its levels of operational capability and professional-
ization. Theoretically at least, NATO membership “served to institutionalize the mili-
tary’s concentration on national or external defense and away from matters of civil
order—a responsibility often accorded to them under authoritarianism.”31 A new
standing army was created to protect the country from the communist axis.32 Further-
more, U.S. assistance in the form of “sophisticated training and support”33 strength-
ened the pro-NATO sentiments within the officer corps and became part of the prevail-
ing ideology within the military establishment.34 As Zaharopoulos put it,
The effect of NATO was to unite the geopolitical interests of the Greek nation with the
corporate and professional interests of its armed forces. It is easy to understand, then,
why for an overwhelming majority of career officers the NATO alliance [was] the closest
thing to a sacred bond, and why anyone who would dare question Greece’s role in it [was]
regarded either as a communist or as a fellow-traveller.35
In other words, it was the socioeconomic and political forces operating within the
state combined with outside influences that led to the seemingly paradoxical phenom-
enon of increased military intervention in civilian affairs at a time when the armed
forces were acquiring the characteristics of a professional elite. NATO membership,
far from consolidating the identification of the armed forces with professional atti-
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tudes, reinforced their politicized sentiments and was unable of hindering the break-
down of democracy.
The main provisions of the 1968 constitution revealed the desire of the regime not
only to politicize the armed forces but also to grant them complete operational auton-
omy. Articles 129 to 132 of the 1968 constitution elevated the status of military profes-
sionals and gave them complete jurisdiction over civilian affairs.36 The commander of
the armed forces, appointed by the government, would now govern the military; once
appointed, he could not be dismissed. Law 58 set the boundaries of the commander’s
jurisdiction. He could reorganize the bureaucracy and day-to-day proceedings of the
Supreme Council of National Defense in the way he chose and, under (ill-defined)
“special conditions,” could take over the administration of one or more parts of the
civilian authorities’ apparatus.
Further articles of the constitution were deliberately drafted in such a way as to
define national security very broadly, thus legitimizing the interference of the armed
forces in matters of civilian concern.37 This tactic aimed at the intervention of the mili-
tary into civilian affairs whenever “social and political conditions” deemed it “appro-
priate” and hence the institutionalization of the regime.38
The Turkish Military in Politics
The military in Turkey has historically played an important role and enjoyed a
strong degree of autonomy. Having been a “warrior state,”39 the Ottoman Empire left
an explicit military-bureaucratic legacy. The Ottoman state was identified with the
military, which played a decisive role in its social, economic, and political organiza-
tion. For example, the military-led Young Ottomans movement gave way to the intro-
duction of constitutional monarchy in 1876, whereas the activities of the Young Turks
in the conspiratorial Committee of Union and Progress brought the downfall of the
absolutist regime of Abdülhamit II in 1908, a process similar to the Military League’s
intervention in Greece in 1909.40 Having these praetorian origins, the military came to
be known as the “guardian” of the state, secularism, and the six principles of
Kemalism (nationalism, secularism, republicanism, popularism, statism, and reform-
ism).41 As a result of its “rationalist” understanding of democracy, according to which
the military has continuously tried to ensure that the regime functions according to the
Kemalist principles and to the best interests of society, there have been four military
interventions (1960, 1971, 1980, 1997).42 Although these interventions are seen as
examples of guardian regimes, where the military “sorts out the mess” in a limited
time and returns power to civilians to avoid future “malpractices and deficiencies,” the
military’s political activism hinders the consolidation of democracy.43
The first military intervention in the history of the Republic came just after Tur-
key’s transition to multiparty politics with the establishment of the Democratic Party
(DP) and its electoral victory in 1950. The military felt challenged by the DP’s popu-
list policy of pleasing the masses by using Islam as a political tool and by the party’s
authoritarian measures against the opposition and the public. Furthermore, contrary to
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Huntington’s professionalization thesis and parallel to the Greek case, Turkey’s entry
into NATO and its subsequent professionalization or modernization facilitated the
military’s political influence rather than limit it. As a result, on May 27, 1960, the mili-
tary took power. Similar to their Greek counterparts, officers made their intention
clear that they would hand power over to a civilian government once the mess created
by the latter was sorted out. After making necessary changes in the institutional con-
figuration, such as setting up a bicameral system with the introduction of the Senate
and the National Security Council (NSC) to advise the government on defense and
security matters, the military restored power to civilians.
Although the Justice Party (JP)—the DP’s successor—won a majority of the votes
in the 1965 and 1969 elections, it was unable to cope with the worsening political situ-
ation. Partly as a result of the liberal atmosphere of the 1961 Constitution and the 1968
student uprising, extreme groups of the right and left appeared in the political scene.
The Enlarged Council of Commanders that met on March 10, 1971, decided to issue a
memorandum. In this, the military was essentially complaining about the JP govern-
ment and threatening to step in unless necessary measures were taken. Following this
“halfway coup,” martial law was proclaimed, State Security Courts (SSC) were estab-
lished, and a series of amendments to the Constitution took place in 1971 and 1973
that strengthened the executive and curbed basic freedoms.
The continuing political polarization of Turkish society during the 1970s was of
crucial importance for the 1980 intervention. The degree of political violence and the
immobilisme of the fragile coalition governments and parliament during much of the
1970s were the main reasons for the 1980 intervention.44 The Cyprus issue in 1974
also affected civil-military relations: whereas the defeat of the Greek army in Cyprus
undermined its credibility and led to the collapse of the junta, the success of the Turk-
ish armed forces and the level of trust people had historically felt toward the military
legitimized its subsequent intervention to politics.
The military regime began on September 12, 1980, and lasted until December 6,
1983. To control political violence, the regime amended the Martial Law Act and gave
enhanced powers to martial law commanders. A fifteen-member committee prepared
the 1982 Constitution, which was a mere reaction to its 1961 predecessor, and central-
ized power on the premise that the state is supreme over the realm of politics.45 The
new constitution abolished the Senate, gave the President a seven-year tenure with
enhanced powers, and increased the powers of the NSC. Provisional Article 15 of the
new constitution provided all NSC members, who exercised legislative and executive
power from 1980 to 1983, with immunity. When the Turkish people approved the new
constitution by an overwhelming majority (91.37 percent), the leader of the military
regime, General Evren, automatically became President, while the other members of
the NSC became members of a newly created body, the Presidential Council. The elec-
toral law was also amended to make it more difficult for smaller parties to pass the
electoral threshold of 10 percent and enter parliament. Clearly, the preference of the
military regime was in a strong government rather than in weak coalitions. Finally,
when the military secured some exit guarantees (such as through the NSC, the SSC,
the Presidency, and the new constitution), it allowed three political parties located in
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the center left and center right of the political spectrum to compete for the general elec-
tions of November 6, 1983.46
From the mid-1990s onward, the failure of civilian governments to limit the grow-
ing influence of Islamism and Kurdish separatism gave the military an opportunity to
get increasingly involved in political affairs.47 The new international environment cre-
ated by the end of the cold war and the Gulf War has also allowed the military to
expand its sphere of influence in various domains, including foreign policy.48
The Welfare Party’s (WP) electoral successes in the 1994 local and 1995 parlia-
mentary elections as well as the formation of a coalition government between the
Islamist WP and the center-right True Path Party alarmed the military since it was the
first time in the Republic’s history that an Islamist party received more votes than its
secular counterparts. Consequently, the military decided to add the issue of Islamic
fundamentalism to the agenda of the NSC meeting scheduled for February 28, 1997.49
In this meeting, military officers argued that politicians governing the country were
ignoring the principle of secularism and using religion for political purposes. It was
also stated that unless the military’s recommendations are followed, “a critical thresh-
old” would be crossed. This was a declaration of implicit political involvement. Fol-
lowing this “postmodern” or “soft” coup of February 28, Prime Minister Erbakan, the
leader of the WP, resigned. Later, on January 16, 1998, the Constitutional Court dis-
solved his party on grounds of an incitement of people’s religious feelings for political
purposes.50 In this instance, the military’s decision to voice its objections through the
NSC without taking power is significant since it reveals a realization of a new set of
constraints placed on its role through the EU monitoring process analyzed below.
Civilianization versus Demilitarization of Civil-Military
Relations and the Role of the European Union
The Greek Case: Civilianization
Despite the problems that the Greek political system faces from time to time, it is by
now widely accepted that democracy in that country is consolidated and secure.51 The
problems that have risen over the past twenty-five years have not been systemic,
threatening the prevalence of democratic decision making, but have been related to old
practices of personalized politics,52 clientelism,53 authoritarian structures of party or-
ganization,54 and the almost absolute dominance of parties over civil society.55
Similar to the Turkish case analyzed below, it is important to emphasize that Greek
domestic developments, of which the repercussions after the military defeat in Cyprus
are foremost, have paved the way for the increasingly decisive influence of the Euro-
pean Union and the gradual civilianization of Greek civil-military relations. In other
words, and while the foundations for successful civilianization were being set as a
result of factors outside the Union’s competence and jurisdiction, it is by no means
certain that Greece would have managed to consolidate democracy; the EU factor,
operating mostly indirectly, is the one that made the difference by forcing various
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interest groups, not least the military, to comply with stringent membership conditions
with regard to their roles in public life.56
Three developments have been at the core of the process of transformation in
Greece. The first was the split brought about in the Right by the junta. The complete
rejection of the colonels’ regime by the democratic right-wing forces paved the way
for their subsequent smooth integration to the post-1974 democratic regime.57 The
Right’s acceptance of the need for democratic politics was, crucially, shown deci-
sively and swiftly after the fall of the colonels. Prime Minister Karamanlis instigated
an Act that legalized all political parties58 and removed “the last major piece of civil
war discriminatory legislation.”59 A year later, in 1975, a new democratic constitution
was enacted.60 Second, a plebiscite called by Karamanlis in December 1974 abolished
the monarchy and institutionalized the Hellenic Republic. The monarchy had histori-
cally played an active political role; the king’s initial endorsement of the junta and his
manipulation of political power in the 1960s that blocked the liberalization of the
regime led to the endorsement of the Republican constitution by a 70 percent popular
majority. Removing this source of antagonism constituted a major step in the direction
of a legitimate democratic polity.
The third and, in our view, most important structural change of the post-1974
regime was the civilianization of the political landscape implemented by the armed
forces’ acceptance of civilian control over political affairs and their exclusive dedica-
tion to the protection of the “motherland.” For such a transformation to take place, a
“focal event” had to occur, and this happened in Cyprus.61 The junta toppled President
Makarios in the summer of 1974 and installed a nationalist leader, Nikolaos Sampson.
This prompted the Turkish military to intervene and led to the de facto partition of the
island.62 The “Cyprus fiasco” stigmatized the army and left it humiliated in the eyes of
the public. It is important to underline that the problem of Cyprus has tradition-
ally acquired important political significance in Greece and that politicians of all
persuasions have supported the rights of “Cypriot Hellenism” in the island as a vote-
maximizing strategy. Any political initiative or outcome seen as damaging to Greek
Cypriots would have dire consequences for its instigators. This is the reason that the
Cypriot miscalculation backfired so greatly for the colonels and led to their downfall.
A few days after the first Turkish intervention, the junta’s leaders called for an extraor-
dinary meeting to prepare the transition to a civilian regime.63
Given the almost unanimous perception of a Turkish threat, armed divisions and
tanks stationed in the Greater Athens area were ordered by Karamanlis to move north
in anticipation of a Turkish invasion.64 A general mobilization was called in July, and
young Greeks wearing military uniforms contributed to an identification of the army
with the people.65 Furthermore, and given that elements of the old regime were still
holding key positions, Karamanlis placed civilian (Averoff) and military (Ghikas) fig-
ures at the head of the key Ministries of Defense and Public Order—figures that
enjoyed widespread respect within the armed forces.66
Moreover, at a macro level, the 1974 events caused a complete reorganization of the
army; the old anticommunist doctrines had proven exaggerated in the face of the
“Turkish danger.” More important, the universal perception of this threat post-1974
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satisfied most of the army’s interest-group demands and reconciled it to an apolitical
role.67 Financially, the constant tension with Turkey ever since 1974 has resulted in
very high defense expenditure.68 Politically, the 1981 election victory of the Socialist
Party (PASOK) posed potential problems in terms of the army’s acceptance of a left-
wing prime minister. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Papandreou’s nationalistic rheto-
ric,69 the continued high expenditure for army equipment, and his signing of the 1983
agreement with the United States for further stationing its bases in Greece paved the
way for harmonious relations. Finally, by 1974, it has been estimated that about three
quarters of the officers purged in 1967 had retaken their positions.70 For army profes-
sionals, this was a clear indication that the new civilian government wished the
restoration of cooperative relations.
While these factors are important in their own right, there are political and eco-
nomic arguments, which point to a causal relationship between the consolidation of
Greek democracy and the European Union. To start with, the European Union played
a significant role in undermining the credibility and international status of the colo-
nels’ regime by freezing the 1962 Association Agreement.71 With reference to the
increasing dependency of Greek products on European markets, it is assumed that this
isolation forced the regime to embark on liberalization policies that led to its ultimate
collapse.72 On a more practical level, the European Union’s stringent rules on demo-
cratic government acted as a powerful motivation for Prime Minister Karamanlis to
expedite the elections in November 1974.73 More generally, EU membership set it as a
direct precondition that civil law would dominate the military’s wishes.74 At a time
when future civil-military relations were a matter of serious concern for the new politi-
cal leadership, EU democratic conditionalities increased the popular appeal of the
Union to embed democracy and subjugate the army to a new operational environment.
Moreover, the new government’s desire to subjugate the army to civilian control was,
on its own, too fragile to allow for such a development. The European Union’s calling
for sweeping democratization in civil society and the armed forces as a precondition
for membership strengthened the hand of Karamanlis in the crucial years after 1974.
“The fact the [European Union] had differentiated its attitude towards the military
government from that of the US, together with its insistence that membership was
open only to states with democratically elected governments led both the Right . . . and
the Centre to regard accession as the best safeguard for Greece’s fledgling democratic
institutions.”75
EU membership was therefore a safety valve for the irreversibility of democratic
practices.76 The new democratic elite used the EU factor shrewdly to establish a hierar-
chical pattern of decision making whereby the armed forces would be subordinate to
civilian leadership. The Turkish threat consolidated the belief shared by many in the
country’s political and economic elites that EU membership and subsequent inclusion
in “multifaceted European networks” guaranteed peace and prosperity.77 The military,
faced with a new set of circumstances resulting from the popular government’s
repeated calls for EU entry and its own reduced credibility, duly obliged. Furthermore,
the “Europeanization of political perspectives” allowed Greek politicians, civil ser-
vants and officials to internalize the norms and procedures of a democratically struc-
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tured polity and transmit them to the wider public.78 Once all-important political play-
ers had grown familiar with liberal-democratic lines of reasoning,79 the degree of
uncertainty over the eventual outcome of decisions would diminish; once this process
was complete, democratic consolidation could be described as a completed process.80
Also important is the argument emphasizing the effect of the European Union’s
financial help to the Greek economy. The Union funds earmarked for Greece both
before the accession and after 1981 helped create a clear linkage between Europe,
democracy, and economic prosperity, reducing economic disparities and creating
pockets of economic growth in erstwhile underdeveloped regions.81 As the economic
situation improved due to EU assistance, the benefits of EU participation became
increasingly obvious even to erstwhile opponents of membership. EU-led economic
growth did not necessitate reductions in the budget of the armed forces under the
Socialist government, as outlined above, and facilitated the imposition of civilian con-
trol by Prime Minister Papandreou over an initially distrustful military. Therefore,
economic flexibility has been crucial in consolidating the armed forces’subjugation to
the government. Conflict-ridden civil-military relations are usually found in economi-
cally weak states, and the European Union’s contribution to the structural transforma-
tion of the character of the Greek economy reduced the army’s uncertainty about its
economic standing in an EU-inspired, liberal-democratic framework.82
The Turkish Case: Demilitarization
In the case of Turkey, there have been mainly three channels for the military’s polit-
ical influence, through which the armed forces have exerted political power. The first
is the NSC, which was established by the 1961 Constitution and is mainly composed
of the President, Prime Minister, ministers related with national security issues, and
four force commanders. The scope and the effectiveness of the NSC were increased
with the constitutional amendments of 1973 and with the 1980 Constitution. Until
quite recently, this mixed body of unelected officials and politicians stood as the de
facto ruling body. The governments of all time were supposed to give priority consid-
eration to the decisions taken in the NSC meetings.83
The second channel of influence was the office of the President of the Republic.
There emerged a de facto tradition that Turkish presidents either were former heads of
the general staff or had a military background. Especially after the 1982 Constitution,
as a result of which the executive powers of the Presidency were strengthened, the
institution of the presidency gained in status and importance.
Third, by using certain practices and its presence in some institutions, the military
is said to have further consolidated its political role. The presence of military judges in
the SSC, which deal with overtly political crimes, and the practice of “state of emer-
gency,” which was designed for southeast Turkey to counter terrorist activities of the
so-called Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), were given as typical examples of such an
influence.
Although the military justified its political dominance through its role as the
“guardian of the national interest,” the Turkish army “eschewed the idea of long term
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military rule.”84 The military tried to find an appropriate formula to enhance democ-
racy, although their understanding of democracy was rationalist and circumscribed.85
After each military intervention, the Turkish military wanted to hand power back to
civilians as soon as possible.86 However, by looking at the channels of the military’s
political influence quoted above, it is possible to claim that restorations of civil-
military relations after each breakdown are of a demilitarization rather than a
civilianization kind. Rather than transfer governing responsibility to civilians at all
levels of government, the military simply withdrew from open public decision making
with some exit guarantees, which allowed it to operate behind the scenes. Especially
after the 1980 intervention, the military institutionalized its political influence through
the NSC, the SSC, and the presidency.87
The European Union has explicitly addressed these deficiencies in Turkish civil-
military relations through official documentation. In the Accession Partnership Docu-
ment, presented to Turkey on November 8, 2000, and in the annual Regular Reports
issued by the European Commission, the main reference point for the political criteria
was human rights and democratization. The European Union has recommended that
Turkey, among others, reduce the role of the NSC to an advisory one, change the com-
position of the SSC, and abolish the state of emergency in the southeast. For example,
the 1998 Regular Report explicitly stated that
the existence of [the NSC] shows that, despite a basic democratic structure, the Turkish
constitution allows the army to play a civil role and to intervene in every area of political
life. . . . The army is not subject to civil control and sometimes even appears to act without
[the] government’s knowledge when it carries out certain large-scale repressive military
operations.88
Recently, however, it appears that Turkey may be moving toward a civilianized
liberal-democratic type of civil-military relations. The 1990s led to the intensification
of EU-Turkish relations, and the decision of the 1999 Helsinki Summit to offer Turkey
the status of a candidate country can be seen as the start of a gradual process leading to
the eventual civilianization of civil-military relations. “In the post-Helsinki period,
the pre-accession mechanisms have made Turkey more positively inclined to the
EU’s requirements and have justified the EU’s interventions into Turkey’s domestic
politics.”89
As far as the NSC is concerned, Article 118 of the 1982 constitution was stating that
“the Council of Ministers shall give priority consideration to the decisions of the
National Security Council [emphasis added]” concerning state security–related sub-
jects. The vague and slippery concept of national security in the Turkish context, simi-
lar to the one employed by the 1967 regime in Greece, was said to increase the room
for the military’s political maneuvering. Furthermore, the Constitution’s wording was
perceived as more “commanding” than “recommending” by the European Union.90
With the “first harmonization package” of October 2001, including thirty-four consti-
tutional amendments, Article 118 was changed so that the Council of Ministers shall
evaluate instead of give priority consideration to the decisions of the NSC. Further-
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more, the number of civilian members in the NSC increased from five to nine. At the
time of writing this article, with the seventh harmonization package, the frequency of
NSC meetings decreased from once every month to once every second month. More-
over, in August 2004, the first civilian rather than military general, Mehmet Yig *it
Alpogan—a career diplomat who served as Turkish ambassador to Greece—was
appointed to lead the NSC.91
The European Union’s demands for a reduced military role brought more direct
improvements in civil-military relations. As described above, the system of the SSC
was another point of criticism by the European Union. Just before the trial of Abdullah
Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, the composition of the SSC was changed, and a judge
from a civilian background was appointed for his case. Later, the functioning powers
and responsibilities of the SSC were revised extensively through harmonization pack-
ages. Following EU-stemming pressures, the state of emergency was also gradually
lifted until the Copenhagen Summit of December 2002. When it comes to the presi-
dency, ever since Özal was elected to this post, the de facto tradition of military gener-
als moving to the presidency is over. Demirel and Sezer have succeeded Özal without
any problems.
The EU-induced improvements in civil-military relations had further positive side
effects. To illustrate, although Turkey had exercised a de facto moratorium on the
death penalty since the early 1980s, the military was hesitant in abolishing it alto-
gether, fearing that such a move may boost terrorism. Furthermore, following the
same logic, the military was not willing to allow the usage of Kurdish in broadcasting
and education. In harmonization packages, the death penalty was first restricted to
cases of terrorist crime and to times of war or imminent threat of war, and then, it was
abolished altogether. Broadcasting and educating in the Kurdish language were
allowed with the amendments brought, again, by harmonization packages.
Furthermore, with the liberal environment created by the EU accession process and
constitutional amendments, some taboo subjects started being discussed openly. For
example, the leader of Motherland Party, Mesut YIlmaz, indirectly accused the mili-
tary of behaving obsessively in their exhaustive understanding of “national security.”
Yilmaz claimed that this behavior is an obstacle for the consolidation of democracy in
Turkey.92 However, the military, like in most cases, confirmed that it was principally
unopposed to the EU accession process but had some objections to the “concessions”
(like the Cyprus issue, Kurdish language, and death penalty) that are likely to be made
on the way to the European Union.93
Finally, the military and the Justice and Development Party (JDP) that came to
power after the November 2002 elections are cooperating fairly smoothly. Despite the
JDP’s pro-Islamic background, the military never questioned its legitimacy to rule and
criticized heavily the rumors of another military intervention by saying that such
events would hinder democracy in Turkey and should be avoided.94
In sum, the EU carrot offered to Turkey raised the hopes for creating an externally
induced system to consolidate democracy since Turkey is now seeking membership in
a group of states where the armed forces are controlled by civilian forces in line with
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the liberal-democratic model. As Cizre argued, “The EU pressure seemed the only
visible factor that might lead to a smaller role for the military in Turkish politics.”95
Conclusion
Civil-military relations in Greece and Turkey have followed a broadly similar tra-
jectory until the 1970s. Following a legacy of praetorian military behavior, democracy
in both cases had been subject to the “exhaustive” national security definitions
employed by the military, which tried to institutionalize its political influence through
measures like the NSC and the “security-oriented,” constitution-making processes.
However, as a result of a complex interplay of contextual and international factors,
Greek civil-military relations came to be civilianized, whereas in the Turkish case, the
era of cyclical demilitarization came to an end. In the Greek case, the focal event facili-
tating the European Union’s role as an external anchor was the 1974 Cyprus crisis that
led to the collapse of the colonels’ junta and the discrediting of the armed forces. The
Turkish threat that Greece lived under in the summer of 1974, in combination with
insightful political and institutional maneuvering by the political leadership, led to the
gradual civilianization of the regime that was confirmed after the Socialist election
victory in the 1980s. For all the domestic changes initiated after 1974, however, the
European Union proved to be the catalyst in “locking in” the democratization of the
civil polity by providing clear political incentives for the removal of the military from
political life. While such a process was initiated by the new leadership, the carrots
associated with EU membership meant that the reduction in the military’s influence
enabled the realization of the new elite’s democratic aspirations.
In the Turkish case, especially after a series of favorable domestic changes took
place, the EU conditionalities fostered the democratic reforms that led to the civilian-
ization of civil-military relations and closed the era of cyclical demilitarization. In the
accession process, the European Union is requesting the curbing of the military’s
political prerogatives as outlined in the Regular Reports and Accession Partnerships.
Furthermore, the democratic reforms undertaken as part of this process and the grad-
ual consolidation of Turkish democracy create a favorable environment for a drastic
improvement in civil-military relations. Recent changes, such as the constitutional
amendments and legal reforms undertaken as part of EU harmonization packages, the
reorganization of the NSC, the abolishment of the SSC, and the lifting of the state of
emergency, illustrate this development.
To conclude, both of our case studies verify the hypothesis of a strong positive cor-
relation between improved civil-military relations and the European Union as an
external actor. Indeed, it is possible to generalize the results of this study to the broader
theory outlined at the beginning and claim that the EU conditionalities, if taking place
in the context of a favorable domestic setting where the maturation of institu-
tional decision making is pointing to a change conducive to the emergence of a liberal-
democratic regime, can accelerate and, crucially, enable the smooth transition to such
a regime.
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